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Trustees of the Plumbers and Pipefitters, Union Local 525 Health and 
Welfare Trust Plan v. Developers Surety and Indemnity Co., 
84 P.3d 59 (Nev. 2004)1 
 
COMMERCIAL LAW & CIVIL PROCEDURE – SURETY, ATTORNEY 
FEES, OFFER OF JUDGMENT  
 
 
Summary 
  
 Appeal from a district court order granting summary judgment to trustee for bond amount 
after principal, employer of union workers, failed to pay requisite contributions and filed for 
bankruptcy.  
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
Reversed and remanded for attorney fees determination. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
Appellant, the Joint Trust, is a group of non-profit organizations formed to provide 
pension, health, and other benefits to the plumbers of Pipefitters Union Local No. 525 
(Pipefitters).  P & P Plumbing (P & P), a plumbing company employing union workers, entered 
into a contract with Pipefitters requiring P & P to make contributions to the Joint Trust for the 
employees’ pension, health, and welfare benefits.  Pursuant to the contract, P & P posted a bond 
with Developers Surety, an indemnity company, to protect the workers’ interests in the event that 
P & P failed to make the requisite benefit contributions.  The bond covered all reasonable 
expenses incurred by Pipefitters in the collection of any of the sum due under the terms and 
provisions of the labor agreement, including accounting, bookkeeping, clerical, and professional 
fees related to collecting on the bond.  The initial bond amount was for $5,000.  On October 8, 
1999, the Joint Trust and P & P, allegedly without Developers Surety's consent, raised the bond's 
value to $20,000. 
P & P failed to pay the required employee contributions in the amount of $30,853.57 and 
filed bankruptcy.  After the bankruptcy, Pahor Air Conditioning (Pahor) assumed some of P & 
P's general contractor projects and agreed to pay the Joint Trust $10,853.57, the portion of P & 
P's delinquencies exceeding the bond's $20,000 value.   
On May 21, 2001, the Joint Trust filed a complaint against Developers Surety to recover 
the $20,000 bond amount.  On June 19, 2001, the Joint Trust made an offer of judgment in the 
amount of $19,200, including fees and costs. Developers Surety, however, rejected the offer and 
answered the complaint. The district court assigned the case to the mandatory, court-annexed 
arbitration program. 
While arbitration was still ongoing, the Joint Trust filed a motion for summary judgment 
with the district court to recover the bond's face amount.  Developers Surety filed an 
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opposition/counter-motion for summary judgment.  The trial court, however, granted the Joint 
Trust’s motion and entered judgment in its favor for $20,000, the bond's penal amount.  
Subsequently, the Joint Trust requested attorney fees and costs on the following grounds: 
(1) as a prevailing party under NRS 18.010(2)(a); (2) for Developers Surety's alleged bad faith 
litigation under NRS 18.010(2)(b); and (3) for making an offer of judgment and later obtaining a 
more favorable judgment under NRS 17.115 and NRCP 68.  The district court granted the Joint 
Trust's request for interest and costs, but refused to award attorney fees. The court stated that 
Basic Refractories precluded an attorney fees award above the bond's penal limit.   
However, on appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court concluded that a surety may be ordered 
to pay attorney fees even if a fees award, in conjunction with the judgment, would exceed the 
bond amount because the surety engaged in direct litigation over the bond.  
 
Discussion 
 
I.  Basic Refractories v. Bright2  
 
According to the Nevada Supreme Court, the district court erred in determining that 
Basic Refractories prohibited attorney fees because the holding of Basic Refractories is 
expressly limited to the procedural posture of that case.3  Consequently, the court held that when 
a secured entity becomes obligated to pay attorney fees in third-party litigation, the surety is not 
liable for these fees if they exceed the bond amount.  However, when the secured entity incurs 
attorney fees in direct litigation with the surety over the bond, attorney fees may be awarded 
under NRS 17.115, NRCP 68, and NRS 18.010. 
 
1.  NRS 17.115 and NRCP 68 
 
NRS 17.115(4)(d)(3) permits the district court to award attorney fees against a party who 
rejects an offer of judgment and later fails to obtain a more favorable judgment.  Pursuant to 
NRCP 68(f)(2), the offeree who rejects an offer and later fails to obtain a more favorable 
judgment must pay the offeror such attorney fees as the district court allows.   
Words in a statute are to be given their plain meaning unless this violates the spirit of the 
act.4  The plain language of NRS 17.115 and NRCP 68 refers to “a party,” meaning any party, 
and an “offeree,” meaning any offeree. Developers Surety falls within the purview of NRS 
17.115 because the statutory language contains no exception for sureties.  If the Legislature 
                                                 
2 72 Nev. 183, 298 P.2d 810 (Nev. 1956). 
3 In Basic Refractories, Standard Slag Company subcontracted with Long Construction Company (“Long”) for the 
construction of residential dwellings.  Under the subcontract, Long promised to surrender the dwellings “free and 
clear” and posted a bond for fifty percent of the contract price.  Globe Indemnity Company issued the bond.  Long 
constructed the residential units, but failed to pay certain labor and material claims.  Consequently, several lien 
claimants filed actions against Standard to foreclose on their liens.  72 Nev. at 188-90, 298 P.2d at 812-13.  The lien 
claimants obtained judgment against Standard in the amount of $29,077.22, $2,004.41 in costs and interest, and 
$6,188.62 in attorney fees.  Id. at 198, 298 P.2d at 817.  Standard then obtained a judgment on its third-party 
complaint against Globe and recovered the bond's penal limit.  After Globe admitted on appeal responsibility for 
costs and interest, even though these amounts exceeded the bond's penal sum, the Nevada Supreme Court increased 
Standard's award to include such costs and interest.  Id. at 198-201, 298 P.2d at 817-19.  Nevertheless, the court 
rejected Standard's claim on appeal that it was also entitled to recover the attorney fees that it owed on the lien 
claimants' judgment.  Id. at 200-01, 298 P.2d at 818. 
4 McKay v. Bd. of Supervisors, 102 Nev. 644, 648, 730 P.2d 438, 441 (Nev. 1986). 
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intended to create such an exception, it would have done so.  This interpretation is consistent 
with the spirit of NRS 17.115 and NRCP 68 because the Nevada Legislature aimed to promote 
settlement and avoid litigation.5 
Here, the Joint Trust submitted an offer of judgment in the amount of $19,200 to 
Developers Surety, but Developers Surety rejected the offer.  Subsequently, the district court 
awarded $20,000 to the Joint Trust.  Because Developers Surety rejected the Joint Trust's offer 
and the Joint Trust later obtained a more favorable judgment, the Nevada Supreme Court found 
that the district court could have awarded the Joint Trust attorney fees under NRS 17.115 and 
NRCP 68. 
The court noted that precluding attorney fees recovery in surety bond disputes contradicts 
legislative intent because it removes the incentive to settle.  By enacting NRS 17.115, the 
Legislature intended to speed up cases in the courts.6  The purpose of NRS 17.115 is to place the 
risk of loss on the offeree who fails to accept the offer, thus encouraging both offers and 
acceptance of offers.7  Limiting attorney fees recovery to the bond’s remaining penal limit when 
the secured party engages in direct litigation with the surety over the bond would decrease the 
surety’s potential litigation loss.  From an attorney fees standpoint, it would generally not matter 
whether the surety litigated the claim or settled before trial.  Consequently, the surety would not 
be stimulated to make or accept settlement offers and this would attenuate Nevada's policy to 
encourage pretrial dispute resolution. 
The court found that limiting attorney fees in all surety bond disputes against the surety 
would not only remove the incentive to settle, it would create an incentive to litigate.  Sureties 
that can invest at rates higher than the legal interest rate might prefer to litigate regardless of the 
litigation outcome.  The court noted that this result would contradict Nevada's policy to 
encourage pretrial settlement.  Thus, the court concluded that NRS 17.115 and NRCP 68 apply to 
direct actions between the secured entity and the surety, and that the district court should have 
considered awarding attorney fees to the Joint Trust under these provisions. 
 
2.  NRS 18.010(2)(a)8 
 
NRS 18.010(2)(a) authorizes the court to award attorney fees to a prevailing party who 
has recovered no more than $20,000. According to the statute, the court shall liberally construe 
the provisions of the statute in favor of awarding attorney’s fees in all appropriate situations. 
Thus, the statute clearly encourages the district court to award attorney fees and it makes no 
exemptions for sureties.  Consequently, the court found that the district court should have 
considered awarding attorney fees under NRS 18.010(2)(a). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Matthews v. Collman, 110 Nev. 940, 950, 878 P.2d 971, 978 (1994); Fleischer v. August, 103 Nev. 242, 245, 737 
P.2d 518, 520 (1987). 
6 Hearing on A.B. 587 Before the Assembly Comm. on Judiciary, 56th Leg. (Nev., March 25, 1971) (statement of 
Assemblyman Howard F. McKissick). 
7 Matthews, 110 Nev. at 950, 878 P.2d at 978. 
8 The Joint Trust argued that the district court should have granted its attorney *63 fees request under NRS 
18.010(2)(a) because it recovered $20,000.  
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3. NRS 18.010(2)(b)9 
 
Prior to 1985, NRS 18.010 did not contain the “bad faith” basis for attorney fees 
recovery.  In 1985, the Legislature authorized the district court to award attorney fees without 
regard to the recovery sought, when the court finds that the claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or 
third-party complaint or defense of the opposing party was brought without reasonable ground or 
to harass the prevailing party.10   
According to the court, the Legislature’s express policy of discouraging frivolous 
litigation applies when the surety is involved in direct bond litigation with the secured entity.  
Consequently, the court held that the district court should have considered whether NRS 
18.010(2)(b) warranted an attorney fees award. 
Furthermore, the court noted that when two or more claims exceed a surety bond's penal 
limits, the surety may initiate an interpleader proceeding under NRCP 22 to avoid exposure to 
double or multiple liability.  The claims do not have to be identical or have a common origin.  
The court has the discretion to approve the interpleader and permit the surety to deposit the 
bond’s remaining penal limits with the court.  The court may then discharge the surety from any 
further liability and equitably distribute the proceeds among the various claimants. 
 
Dissent 
 
MAUPIN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
 Justice Maupin concurred in the result reached by the majority.  However, he wrote 
separately to note his concern with the majority's speculations regarding a bonding company’s 
investment strategies.  He found no support in the record for the proposition that sureties might 
withhold settlement commitments based upon their abilities to invest reserved funds at a rate of 
return greater than the legal rate of interest. 
 
Conclusion 
  
This decision makes clear that a surety may be ordered to pay attorney fees even if a fees 
award, in conjunction with the judgment, would exceed the bond amount because the surety 
engaged in direct litigation over the bond.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 The Joint Trust asserted that the district court should have considered its attorney fees request under NRS 
18.010(2)(b) because Developers Surety acted in bad faith by defending the claim without reasonable grounds and 
by unlawfully obstructing the Joint Trust's access to evidence. 
10 1985 NEV. STAT., ch. 83, § 1, at 327. 
